What Characterizes Pictures and Text by Biggs, M.
What Characterizes Pictures and Text?1
 
Dr Michael A R Biggs 
Faculty of Art and Design 
University of Hertfordshire 
College Lane 
Hatfield 
AL10 9AB 
UK 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper addresses an apparently trivial question: what is the difference between 
graphics and text? It appears to be trivial because there appears to be several 
alternative and simple ways of answering it. For example, 'text is made up of letters 
whereas graphics are not', 'one can create text using a keyboard', 'one can read text 
aloud', etc. However, none of these provides robust conditions to differentiate graphics 
from text, e.g. cases such as typewriter art and gobbledygook can be identified. 
The paper approaches the problem of identifying content conditions by analysing 
boundary cases which lie on the margins and are difficult to classify. It considers 
examples that arise in the production of materials, including bitmapped text, graphics 
consisting of letters and words, text used as patterns or in tables, etc. It also considers 
examples that arise from the consumption of materials, including a comparison of the 
methods used for reading and interpreting text and graphics. 
This paper concludes that current XML specifications, e.g. TEI guidelines, for the 
integration of graphics into text are primarily made on the basis of form rather than 
content. This is incompatible with a content-based markup scheme. Before such 
guidelines can be modified we must be clearer about what differentiates graphics from 
text in terms of content conditions rather than a technological or formal conditions. 
Let me start with a simple statement of the problem. When one encodes a source in a 
descriptive markup language one must identify features, describe them, and place that 
description in the appropriate place in the code string. In typical cases of graphics this 
will involve inserting a reference to an external graphical file type such as a JPEG2 into a 
string of text. However, being-a-JPEG is not synonymous with being-a-graphic, for 
example, a scanned typescript is graphical in file type but textual in content. Similarly, 
SVG3 is textual in file type but graphical in content. Therefore if we are to be consistent 
in applying descriptive markup we should be able to differentiate between graphical 
content and graphical file types, textual content and textual file types, and then describe 
as graphics that which has graphical content. In practice this is not as easy as it sounds 
because there always seem to be exceptions to any description one might make of what 
constitutes graphical content. For example, is 'colon right-parenthesis' a smiling-face 
graphic4, or is it only graphical when we use a symbol, e.g. Unicode 263A? 'Typewriter 
art' creates an image using typewriter characters and these may be arranged in 
horizontal lines. However, we distinguish between this and gobbledygook, i.e. 
meaningless strings of characters. We could also imagine a page in which the pattern of 
the text coincidentally resembled a face. Brand names such as 'Coca-Cola' are often 
given a particular appearance to form graphical trademarks. If we agree that all of these 
could be said to have graphical content then graphics cannot be defined simply by 'line 
type' or by being 'pictorial'. According to Mitchell 'we still do not know what exactly 
pictures are' (1986: 13). 
On the basis that the literature about 'what is a text' (Gelb 1963, Coulmas 1990, 
deRose 1990, etc.) is more extensive than the literature on 'what is a graphic' (Doblin 
1980, Mitchell 1986, Biggs 1995, etc.), I shall consider some descriptions of text to 
determine by reduction what might be a description of a graphic. The problem of 
describing document features has been approached reductively before, i.e. Sperberg-
McQueen, Huitfeldt & Renear (2000: 217), but little work has been undertaken on the 
boundary between graphics and text, and how such a boundary might be drawn for the 
purposes of document description, e.g. in XML5. Most of the commentary on text 
encoding assumes a textual context, and considers the problem to consist of two parts: 
providing an external reference and providing a textual description of the graphical 
content. For example, the TEI6 guidelines on descriptive markup (Sperberg-McQueen & 
Burnard 2001: §22.3) include recommendations about how to markup 'figures'. It 
assumes textual content into which are inserted graphical file types. These external 
references and other source information are marked as <figure> but in so doing they fail 
to describe the content as opposed to the form. The question therefore remains, what is 
textual content and what is graphical content, and if we are to describe or markup a 
source, how might we determine which features to mark as which? 
 I will assume that we are interested in the interpretation and description of a 
manuscript source that may contain graphics and text, and other forms of notation 
common in Western Europe, e.g. European character sets such as Latin and Greek, 
European languages, mathematical, logical and musical notation, etc. The purpose of 
this restricted scope is not because the discussion is limited to such contexts but 
because the description of the diversity of features in other contexts would make this 
paper too long. I believe that the problem is transferable to non-Western contexts and 
syllabic rather than phonetic writing systems, etc. The purpose of differentiating features 
in any source document is in order to apply descriptive markup. 
 
 
 
The Problem 
 
Writing and drawing are everyday activities: the simple acts of making communicative 
marks on paper. We do not require any sophisticated equipment to write or draw: a 
pencil and paper are quite sufficient for both. With them we can write down a narrative, 
illustrate it, annotate a passage of music, and all these things we can do apparently 
seamlessly, just using the paper and the pencil. So at the moment of production there 
seems to be nothing especially remarkable or separable about the activities of writing 
and drawing. In particular there is no convention that we adopt for marking the beginning 
and the end of each notational system. But when we come to reproduce these notations 
using conventional technologies we find that we need different resources for different 
kinds of notation. The written text we convert into typography; fonts of conventionalized 
letterforms that we might enter via a keyboard. For musical notation we will require 
special typesetting or software, different from that required for text. And for images we 
may have to scan them from the original source document, converting them into lines of 
tones and colours. So at the point of reproduction some differences emerge between the 
tools that we require to reproduce text, non-textual conventional notations such as 
music, mathematics, etc., and graphics, and the boundaries between them. This 
description accords with Gelb's definition of writing [text] as 'a system of human 
intercommunication by means of conventional visible marks' (1963: 12). From this we 
might infer that musical notation is also a form writing but that drawing, being a system 
of human intercommunication by means of non-conventional visible marks, is not. 
However, the fact that we might have a bitmapped image at one point, and a 
string of ASCII at another, tells us nothing about the content of the source. As we have 
seen, having a graphical file type at a certain point cannot be regarded as an indicator of 
graphical content at that point. For example, if I scan a printed document, does its 
content (as opposed to its form) become graphics? What if I create an image in SVG, 
does its content become text? Separating form from content accords with Coulmas's 
description of writing, i.e. 'textual content', as 'linguistic content' (1990: 27). Conventional 
text can be read aloud, music less so, and graphics not at all. Reciting the content of an 
SVG file does not conjure up an image. 
Finally, as readers we adopt different strategies for following the sequence of 
conventionalized symbols in normal text, the two-dimensional but left-right progressing 
notation of music on a stave, and the free-forms of graphics that our eyes may scan in 
whatever direction we please within the graphics boundary. This accords with Larkin and 
Simon's differentiation of 'sentential structure and diagrammatic structure' (1987: 66). 
Conventional text has a sentential structure. Musical notation has some kind of variant 
on that structure, and drawing uses the page surface in a completely non-sentential or 
diagrammatic way. 
 We can see that the sequence of marks across the page during writing and 
reading might characterize some change in mode between textual content and graphical 
content, and the accidents of contemporary technology might for the time being give us 
additional grounds to make a distinction. But what we need is some way of identifying 
these and other features more clearly so that (a) they can be classified and described, 
and (b) so that start and end points can be assigned to them in the marked-up text that 
is itself a linear string of code. 
 But even this does not fully describe the problem. Coombs, Renear and deRose 
(1987: basic theory) have argued that 'doing markup' consists of three stages: 'element 
recognition, markup selection and markup performance'. Before we can classify a 
feature as graphics or not, and then determine where to put start and end tags, we must 
first recognize and identify the feature to be encoded. I have mentioned text, musical 
notation, mathematical notation, and graphics. But there are perhaps no natural 
categories for textual features, or at least those features for which we have names are 
not mutually exclusive categories in a single taxonomy. For example, quotations might 
cross paragraph boundaries, or we might have a graphical interest in a hand-written text 
if we were a graphologist. In summary, in such cases we are faced with 'practical 
problems which raise philosophical issues' (Biggs & Huitfeldt 1997: 348). These 
philosophical issues arise because 'there are no facts about a text which are objective in 
the sense of not being interpretational' (Huitfeldt 1992: 149). 
 
 
Writing 
 
At the point of production, the empty manuscript page is quite non-directive: one can use 
it in many different ways. To this extent it is a more liberal environment than sitting at the 
keyboard. However, the expression of ideas is not necessarily synonymous with the 
expression of linguistic content. It is only one model of authorial activity that consists of 
writing/typing linguistic content in a string so that it appears as an equivalent to the 
printed page. But this one-dimensionality is a technological rather than a 
conceptual/structural feature. The source may actually contain deletions, over-written 
amendments, inter-linear additions; it may contain content in a variety of languages, it 
may contain spelling and grammatical mistakes, it may be simple to understand the 
content, difficult, impossible for anyone other than the author, or it may be nonsense 
(impossible for anyone to understand or meaningless). All these are factors that would 
affect the later interpretation of the notation. In addition the author may use notations 
such as logic and mathematics, which share with alphabetic writing a set of 
conventionalized signs but depart from it in the rules for their combination and the spatial 
distribution of the symbols on the page, for example the content difference between 22 
and 2²; the 'principle of position' (Gelb 1965: 19). Diagrammatic structure can also be 
exploited in the creation of tables of data which show correspondences according to 
spatial relationships of clusters of sequenced symbols. Finally, although this is not an 
exhaustive list of possibilities, graphics can be introduced which contain non-sequenced 
graphical marks or tokens. In describing the manuscript source one should also note that 
all of these possibilities are equally available at any place on the page and there is no 
requirement to start a new line for a graphic, or to place a table inside a box. There are 
no necessary devices to signify the beginning of a particular form of notation although 
there are cues in the structure of the notation itself, which result in confirmation or 
reinforcement of the hypothesized content. 
 We should therefore differentiate between markup in which the basic structure is 
sentential but the principle of position confers meaning on certain elements, e.g. 
mathematical notation, and fully diagrammatic structures in which there is no sentential 
organisation at all, such as tables. I will call mathematical (etc.) notations 'distributed-
sentential structures' in order to reflect the way in which they occupy a mid-ground in 
terms of spatial structure. I also propose that, despite being inefficient, such notations 
may have a linguistic equivalent, i.e. they can be 'read aloud' and converted into 
sentential structures. Or better: that diagrammatic structures are those which have no 
linguistic equivalent. 
 
 
Reading 
 
At the point of consumption the reader is presented with the manuscript page in the 
absence of the author. Identifying the authorial use of two-dimensional space is much 
more problematic than the interpretation of orthographic tokens as alphanumeric 
graphemes. On unruled paper orthographic mistakes and ambiguity in the use of white-
space can easily hide the signifying features of the notation and it is only as meaning is 
construed from hypothetical interpretations of the notation that we can become confident 
about a particular reading. If the author is mistaken in his or her use of convention or is 
being creative then interpretation is further problematized. 
 The interpretation of the page depends upon the identification of cues or 
metatextual [pre-textual] elements. In turn this identification is a reflection of the interests 
of the reader; 'our aim in transcription is not to represent as correctly as possible the 
originals, but rather to prepare from the original text another text so as to serve as 
accurately as possible certain interests in the text' (Pichler 1995: 691). The principal 
deciphering activity is the identification of recognisable letterforms. The reader is cued to 
seek individual letterforms by the horizontal linear organisation of the marks on the page. 
Within this linearity the task is to identify letterforms from the variable orthography. 
Confirmation of linguistic content is achieved by the consistent identification of a 
character set which itself forms identifiable words delimited by white-spaces and line 
breaks, etc. At this point the key activity is the suppression of reading individual 
graphical marks as signifying tokens in preference to the interpretation of these marks as 
the repeated use of a limited range of graphemes (Coulmas 1990: 51) belonging to a 
character set. Multi-linguistic texts may add an additional level of complexity but at a 
word level we are likely to be presented with single character sets at a time. Mixed 
character sets in a putative word unit (a space delimited string) may signify a non-
linguistic notational form such as mathematics or logic. Logic provides an interesting 
case because examples can be constructed which use the characters from linguistic 
notation but which do not follow the combinatorial rules of natural language notation. 
 The cues to a change in language, or language group are to a lesser extent the 
presence of characteristic letterforms, such as Þ (Unicode 00DE, Latin uppercase Thorn, 
characteristic of Icelandic and Old English), but to a greater extent by the recognition of 
linearly organized graphemes delimited by spaces into word-units corresponding to a 
natural language vocabulary. Unpacking the activity in this way demonstrates the many 
processes that precede the identification of linguistic content that forms the default mode 
of the textual interpretation of source documents. At any of these levels mistakes and 
ambiguities can interfere with the recognition of authorial content and the interpretation 
of notation, including the presence or absence of certain content objects such as text or 
graphics. 
 All this could be taken as the default mode, in other words, having identified 
linearly organized graphical marks that comprise orthographic tokens that can be 
interpreted as graphemes forming words with spatial delimiters, we proceed to interpret 
the marks on the basis that they continue to be text in the established natural language 
until we are cued to adopt an alternative interpretational strategy. This corresponds to 
the assumption in text encoding, that the content consists of Unicode strings unless 
indicated to the contrary. The departure from this default interpretation is normally cued 
by a different spatial organisation, or by non-Unicode content. However, the example of 
typewriter art shows that one does not have to depart from Unicode in order to create 
graphics. If we describe the normal sentential organisation of the text string (which in 
English has a left-right in-line progression and a top-bottom block progression), as 
'passive' then we can say that 'active' spatial organisation is a cue for an alternative 
interpretational strategy. 
 Tables are active spatial layouts of textual content in which the relative position 
of the elements is itself signifying. They are unlike conventional text in which the relative 
spatial juxtaposition of elements other than the linear sequencing of the letters and word 
units, is non-signifying. This accords with Larkin and Simon's definition of diagrammatic 
structure. Tables are not necessarily indicated by containment in boxes and so it is 
frequently the lack of expected sentential linearity, or the loss of meaning grammatically 
or semantically when interpreted as sentential structure, that suggests that the author 
may have departed from sentential text-organisational mode. This cues us, on the 
assumption that the marks continue to be purposive and signifying, to seek other 
meaningful modes of textual organisation or meaningful non-textual signification. These 
might be further cued by extrinsic elements such as comments in the preceding text that 
refer to a table. Finally, an assumption of spatial signification may be imposed as a 
desperate attempt to satisfy our desire for signification in text that seems sententially 
disordered or ruptured (the shopping list, jottings, etc). 
 
 
Interpretation 
 
All this takes place in a context of purpose: an attempt to infer meaning from the source 
material. What is meaningful will depend on our interests. Perceiving something as 
meaningful depends on element recognition which in turn requires us to be receptive to 
a meaningful aspect (Renear 2001: 415). For example, it might be the case that until a 
graphologist draws our attention to the signification of handwriting, we attribute no 
particular significance to whether a document is written in the author's own hand or the 
hand of another. Wittgenstein calls this new awareness 'seeing an aspect' (1953: 213). If 
we do not even recognize the possibility of signification, e.g. of handwriting, we are said 
to be 'aspect-blind'. Wittgensteinian aspect-blindness is a factor in the encoding of text. 
One must 'first recognize the deliberate ambiguity, and then encode it so that the 
linguistic content and the on-screen presentation preserves these two senses' (Biggs & 
Huitfeldt 1997: 357). But this depends on seeing the ambiguity in the aspect and this in 
turn depends upon what interest one has in the text. There are also examples where the 
presentation is inextricable from the content, e.g. this is underlined, in which 'the medium 
is the message' (Biggs & Huitfeldt 1997: 356). There are therefore, many contextual 
presuppositions to the interpretation of a source and by implication, the differentiation of 
'graphical' content from 'linguistic/textual' content. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The reductive method is a useful account of the interpretation of assumed textual 
content in a source document. Identification proceeds from graphemes to words, etc. 
Disruption of these inferences causes us to find signification in diagrammatic structures 
such as tables. An intermediate category of distributed-sentential structures has been 
proposed, e.g. mathematical and logical notation, which use the principle of position. It is 
proposed that this category may have 'linguistic equivalent'. It is argued reductively that 
when content is not sententially organized, nor has linguistic content, then it may be 
graphical. The advantage of this method is that it can identify graphical content or 
behaviour rather than relying on the perception of graphical appearance, e.g. drawn 
lines and pictures. The identification of graphics by the technological resources needed 
for their reproduction reflects neither the strategy employed in their production nor their 
consumption (writing and reading). In terms of TEI markup, the <figure> tag as a content 
descriptor should not be confined to references to external resources, nor should the 
<text> tag, if considered a content descriptor, be a base tag for a document. 
 
  linguistic content non-linguistic content 
1 sentential structure <text>  
2 distributed-sentential structure <notation> (maths, logic, etc) <notation> (music) 
3 diagrammatic structure  <figure> (graphics) 
 
 This paper therefore modifies Larkin and Simon's binary description of structure 
by differentiating 2 from 3, thereby leaving 3 more closely associated with 'graphical 
content'. It also implies that the content of a manuscript source is graphical until 
identified as textual. 
 The advantage of a reductive approach is to overcome the difficulty of accounting 
for the enormous diversity of graphical content and therefore of providing a 
characterising description of graphics in general. By extending the process of document 
feature description adopted for textual content we can narrow the field in which graphics 
lie. In particular we can show that sometimes letterforms and other 'textual content' can 
be used graphically, e.g. tables and typewriter art. 
Notes 
 
 
1 An early version of this paper was read at a seminar at the Humanities 
Information Technologies Research Centre, University of Bergen, on 21 May 2003. I 
acknowledge the support of the European Community Access to Research 
Infrastructures Action and the support of the EU ARI WAB management at the 
Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen 
 
2 Joint Photographic Experts Group 
 
3 Scalable Vector Graphic 
 
4 :) is a text messaging convention for ☺, signifying pleasure 
 
5 Extensible Markup Language 
 
6 Text Encoding Initiative 
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